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WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN: DO INDIAN
TRIBES WITH INSOLVENT GAMING
OPERATIONS HAVE THE ABILITY TO




Indian gaming has become increasingly popular in the United States, with
casino and resort facilities on federally recognized Indian land rivaling the likes
of Las Vegas and Atlantic City casinos.  Since the passage of the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act of 1988 (“IGRA”), gaming activities on Indian reservations
across the country have skyrocketed, providing a substantive source of revenue
to once economically downtrodden tribes.  The IGRA places Indian tribes
involved in gaming operations in a unique position because it affords them
federal protection and oversight with respect to gaming operations, whereas
state law regulates private gaming operations.  In a relatively short amount of
time, Indian gaming has become extremely lucrative for many Native Ameri-
can tribes, and tribes without gaming activities have scrambled to reap these
benefits by developing and expanding casinos on their own reservations.
Like non-Indian casino business ventures, casinos on Indian reservations
were thought to be, for the most part, recession proof.1  However, the current
recession in America, which some have coined the Great Recession,2 has
proven otherwise.  Casinos all over the country are feeling the consequences of
high unemployment rates and tighter budgets,3 including casinos on Indian res-
* Law Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Nevada.  J.D., 2010, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas – William S. Boyd School of Law.  A special thanks to my family and friends for
their encouragement and support, the Honorable Bruce A. Markell, for his suggestions and
guidance, the UNLV Gaming Law Journal for their patience and hard work, and my
husband, Josue´ – for everything.
1 See, e.g., THOMAS R. MIRKOVICH & ALLISON A. COWGILL, CASINO GAMING IN THE
UNITED STATES: A RESEARCH GUIDE 39 (1997) (casino gaming is generally considered
recession proof).
2 See Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology, THE N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2009), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-etymology
(providing a brief synopsis on the origin of the term widely used to describe the current
economic depression in the United States).
3 See generally Adam Nagourney, Las Vegas Faces Its Deepest Slide Since the 1940s, THE
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/us/03vegas.html?scp=1&sq
=casino%20recession&st=cse (noting that the current decline in gaming revenue in Las
Vegas, Nevada is consistent with decreases in consumer spending during an economic reces-
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ervations.4  As one Indian casino teetered on the edge of insolvency,5 an impor-
tant question arises for Indian tribes engaged in gaming operations: can Indian
tribes – a group recognized as sovereign nations within the United States – seek
bankruptcy relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code?
This Note will first give an overview of Indian sovereignty and its rela-
tionship to the federal government of the United States.  Part II will examine
the Indian Gaming Regulation Act, which provides Indian tribes great latitude
in developing gaming activities on their reservations.  Part III will examine the
historical development of bankruptcy in the United States and how the Bank-
ruptcy Code in its current form has come to be developed.  Finally, Part IV will
analyze the possibilities of an Indian tribe filing for bankruptcy under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.  This Note concludes that because the Bankruptcy Code does not
currently provide a basis for Indian tribes to file bankruptcy, either in terms of
eligibility or type of bankruptcy relief, it is unlikely that tribes may file for
bankruptcy under current federal law.
I. INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE UNITED STATES: IS IT OBSOLETE?
Native American6 law is a complex blend of American history, treaties
with Native American tribal nations, federal law, and principals of international
law.7  This Note neither intends nor purports to fully address the complex rela-
tionship between Indian tribes and the United States government.  Instead, it
sion, as “Americans [typically] cut back on recreational travel and gambling during a
recession.”).
4 Stephen Singer, In a First for Indian Casinos, Revenue has Fallen, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2,
2011 2:12 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9LN9DC80.htm. See
also Hugo Martı´n, California’s Indian Casinos Slowly Recovering from Recession, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-0303-indian-gambling-201103
03,0,4141377.story.
5 In 2009, Foxwoods Resort Casino, a hotel-casino resort owned by the Mashantucket West-
ern Pequot Tribal Nation in Mashantucket, Connecticut, began seeking to restructure its
debts with creditors outside of bankruptcy, after running into significant financial trouble
following in the wake of the “Great Recession.” See Beth Jinks & Jonathan Keehner,
Foxwoods Casino Owner Mashantucket Tribe Seeks Debt Restructure, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
26, 2009, 6:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDLZ5Y
gh2R7o; Kathryn Rand, Slipping into Bankruptcy? Foxwoods Struggles With Debt as Gam-
ing Revenue Slumps, INDIAN GAMING NOW (Sept. 3, 2009), http://indiangamingnow.com/
blog/slipping-bankruptcy-foxwoods-struggles-debt-gaming-revenue-slumps.  A year later,
Foxwoods continued to work on restructuring its debt outside of the federal bankruptcy
system. See Brian Hallenbeck, Mashantuckets introduce Scott Butera, new Foxwoods CEO,
THEDAY.COM (Nov. 11, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.theday.com/article/20101111/BIZ02/
101119931/1047 (stating that as of November 2010, the tribe “has been in debt-restructuring
talks with lenders for more than a year.”).
6 This Note uses the terms “Indian” and “Native American” interchangeably when referring
to the indigenous people that Christopher Columbus encountered when he landed in present
day America. See Christina Berry, What’s in a Name? Indians and Political Correctness,
ALL THINGS CHEROKEE, http://www.allthingscherokee.com/articles_culture_events_070101.
html (last visited Jan. 4, 2011) (noting that, although there appears to be some confusion and/
or debate in terms of what term is culturally correct, generally speaking, it is preferable to
refer to Indians/Native Americas according to their respective tribe).
7 R. Spencer Clift, III, The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes; Their Recent
Dramatic Commercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the Eligibility of Indian Tribes
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provides a cursory overview of this relationship as a backdrop to the question
of whether tribal nations may file for bankruptcy relief under federal law.
The United States has historically struggled to legally define its relation-
ship with Native American tribal nations.8  This struggle initially arose in the
judicial context as courts attempted to define the legal status of tribal nations
within the United States.  The United States Constitution addresses tribal
nations in a manner that acknowledges these nations as distinct and separate
political entities.9  Specifically, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the right
to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes[.]”10
Early Supreme Court cases took the basis for Indian sovereignty provided
for in the U.S. Constitution and defined the legal parameters of such sover-
eignty, establishing that Native American tribes were “domestic dependent
nations” of the United States.11  Three cases in particular – Johnson v.
M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia, colloquially
referred to as the “Marshall Trilogy” – established the early and primary “legal
foundation for federal Indian policy.”12  This Trilogy established the legal basis
for the federal government’s taking of Native American land via application of
the European-based “doctrine of discovery.”13  This doctrine advanced the the-
ory that a discovering nation, such as the United States, “inherited the sole right
of acquiring soil from the natives.”14  The Supreme Court determined that,
while the federal government rightfully acquired title to Indian lands simply
because of its status as the discovering nation, Indian tribes maintained the
“right to use and possess [these] lands subject to conquest or purchase by the
government.”15  To this day, application of this policy, based on the doctrine of
discovery, continues to be good law; courts continue to consider this doctrine in
cases involving Indian tribes.16
Under the Bankruptcy Code and Related Matters, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV.177, 184 (2002-
2003) (citations omitted).
8 See generally Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (providing an early
examination of the unique relationship between the United States and Indian tribes); see also
U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (noting that “[t]he relation of the Indian tribes
living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the Revolution, to the
people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one, and of a complex
character.”).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commonly referred to as the Indian Commerce Clause).
10 Id.
11 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
12 Nicholas A. Fromherz & Joseph W. Mead, Equal Standing with States: Tribal Sover-
eignty and Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 155 (2010)
(citations omitted) (the “Marshall Trilogy” is in reference to Chief Justice John Marshall,
who wrote the opinions for the court majority in the three seminal cases).
13 Id. (citing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584-87 (1823)).
14 Id. (citing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823) (internal citation
omitted)).
15 Id. at 155-56. (citing Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234
(1985)).
16 Id. at 156 (citing Andrew Huff, Indigenous Land Rights and the New Self-Determination,
16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 295, 299 (2005); Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446
F.3d 410, 415-16 (3d Cir. 2006); Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 382 F.3d 245, 260-
72 (2d. Cir. 2004); W. Mohegan Tribe v. Orange Cnty., 395 F.3d 18, 22-23 (2d. Cir. 2004)).
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In Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall noted that, although Indian
tribes did not qualify as “foreign state[s] in the sense of the constitution,”17
Indian tribes were in fact a state of some type:
The numerous treaties made with [Indian tribes] by the United States recognize them
as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsi-
ble in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any
aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their
community.18
Justice Marshall analogized the relationship between Indian tribes and the
federal government as something akin to that of a “ward to his guardian.”19
Thus, although recognizing that Indian tribes encompassed a separate and dis-
tinctive body of people within the United States, tribes did not constitute a
foreign government.  Instead, the federal government assumed a patriarchal
role over Indian tribes because these tribes looked to the United States for pro-
tection and care.20  Applying this line of reasoning, Justice Marshall deter-
mined that the tribes’ unique situation constituted “domestic dependent
nations,” falling within the purview of the federal government’s protection, but
more importantly, its power and authority.21
In Worcester v. Georgia, the court addressed a state’s ability to regulate
Indian tribes within its boundaries.22  In the opinion, Justice Marshall contin-
ued to expound on the concept of “domestic dependent nations” with respect to
Indian tribes.  In examining the issue of whether states had the ability to exert
any authority over Indian tribes, the court noted that “Indian nations had always
been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial. . . .  The very term ‘nation,’ so generally applied to them, means
‘a people distinct from others.’”23  Thus, once again, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that Indian tribes were a separate and distinct group within the United
States, akin to separate nations with the ability to self-govern in some respects,
but without the full recognition of a foreign nation.  In doing so, Worcester
further established the “domestic dependant nations” policy by holding that the
federal government, and not the states, had the sole power to regulate Indian
tribes.24
Consequently, as the United States developed as a country, the Supreme
Court established the legal framework and policy as to Indian sovereignty by
recognizing that such sovereignty existed, but simultaneously limiting it to that
of “domestic dependent nations” of the federal government.  Indian tribes
became legally recognized as a separate and distinct group with the ability to
self-govern to a certain extent, but nonetheless became subordinates to the
United States government.  Thus, the “domestic dependant nations” policy
17 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831).
18 Id. at 16.
19 Id. at 17.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
23 See id. at 559.
24 Id. at 595-96.
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established in the Marshall Trilogy provided a lasting legacy that not only
promulgated the legal framework for Indian sovereignty, but deeply influenced
the federal government’s approach and interaction with Indian tribes.
Currently, the argument can and is often made that through case law, the
Supreme Court has chipped away at the sovereign status of Indian tribes.25
Relatively recent Supreme Court cases seem to be at odds with defining the
legal boundaries of Indian sovereignty with respect to tribes’ authority over
non-members on tribal lands.  For example, Indian tribes do not possess crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-tribal members, even when non-tribal members com-
mit crimes on Indian reservations and against members of the tribe.26  Nor do
Indian tribes necessarily have civil jurisdiction over non-tribal members on
Indian land.27  In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court observed that
expanding Indian sovereignty “beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent
status of the tribes[.]”28  This statement seemingly encapsulates the contempo-
rary policy of limiting Indian sovereignty to the extent necessary to keep in
accord with the government’s “domestic dependant nations” policy with
respect to Indian tribes.  Thus, the Court’s relatively recent decisions on Native
American issues reflect conflicting and perhaps shifting paradigms on Indian
policy.
Despite this tension in the law, Indian tribes continue to possess various
forms of meaningful sovereignty.29  Epitomizing the most common perception
of Indian sovereignty, tribes possess the right to self-governance; that is, tribal
governments can establish their own constitutions and pass laws with respect to
its members and lands.30  Moreover, in accord with sovereign status, Indian
tribes continue to enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity in the legal sys-
tem.31  This means that tribes may not be sued in federal court without the
tribe’s express and unequivocal consent or Congressional abrogation.32
Although certainly imperfect, Indian tribes today continue to enjoy a unique
and relatively sovereign relationship with the federal government.
25 See, e.g., Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the
Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 597 (2010) (citations omitted);
Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Self-Determination in the Age of Scarcity, 54 S.D. L. REV. 398,
398  (2009) [hereinafter Kunesh] (citations omitted).
26 Fromherz, supra note 12, at 159 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212
(1978); see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 (2001)).
27 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (“A tribe may also retain inher-
ent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”).
28 See id. at 564.
29 Fromherz, supra note 12, at 165.
30 Kunesh, supra note 25, at 401 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557
(1975)).
31 Fromherz, supra note 12, at 166 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58
(1978)).
32 Id. (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).
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II. THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT: AN ARGUABLE VEHICLE TO
INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Indian gaming gained a foothold in American culture with Congress’ pas-
sage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.33  Congress primarily
passed this law in response to California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
a Supreme Court case involving gaming operations on Indian reservations.34  In
Cabazon, two tribes – the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians –
conducted bingo games on their respective reservations.35  These games were
open to the public and predominantly patronized by non-tribal members travel-
ing onto the reservations.36  In its opinion, the Court noted that these games
provided both tribes considerable benefits, including increased employment
opportunities for tribal members and a substantive source of revenue.37
Despite these appreciable benefits to the tribes, California sought to regu-
late the games under California law.38  Specifically, the state sought to regulate
the gaming activities under a state law that solely permitted games to be oper-
ated by members of designated charitable organizations on a volunteer basis.39
This state law also precluded operators from earning any revenue from gaming
activities.40  Under this construct, the tribes would have been precluded from
employing members to operate the games and from obtaining any profits from
its gaming activities; instead, the tribes would have been required to place prof-
its into a special account that in turn could only be used for charitable purposes
as designated by the state of California.41
The Court noted that its decisions have “consistently recognized that
Indian tribes retain ‘attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory,’”42 but qualified that such sovereignty was subordinate only to the
federal government and not to states.43 Notwithstanding this limitation, states
could apply their laws to Indian tribes, but only when expressly provided by
Congress.44  Under this principle, California argued that Congress had done so
in passing Public Law 280.45  Public Law 280 provided a handful of states
33 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (1988).
34 Kathryn R.L. Rand, Caught In The Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and State
Courts Constrain Tribal Influence Over Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 976 (2007)
(citation omitted).
35 480 U.S. 202, 204-05 (2006) (citations omitted).  The Cabazon band also conducted






41 See id. at 209.
42 Id. at 207 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).
43 Id. (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 154 (1980)).
44 Id.
45 Id. (citing Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953), codified as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (1982 & Supp. III).  The State also argued that Congress had explicitly con-
sented that states to apply law on tribes in the Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. 937
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006)).
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(including California) limited civil and broad criminal jurisdiction over por-
tions of Indian reservations.46  However, the Court clarified that this law was
meant to be a means for states to “combat[ ] lawlessness on reservations,”47 not
provide a basis for “total assimilation of Indian tribes into mainstream Ameri-
can society.”48  Therefore, although Public Law 280 gave a few states some
jurisdictional authority over tribal lands, the Court effectively narrowed any
perceived jurisdictional gap with respect to civil matters on Indian reservations
to “private civil litigation [involving reservation Indians] in state court.”49
Because this jurisdictional gap was limited to preclude civil (and regulatory)
authority, the court determined that Public Law 280 did not provide California
the statutory basis to intercede and regulate the tribes’ gaming activities.50  In
this respect, states were effectively barred from regulating Indian gaming
operations.
Responding to Cabazon and the small but growing number of tribes
engaging in gaming operations “without clear standards or regulations,”51 Con-
gress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988.52  The IGRA was the
culmination of several years of legislative discussion with respect to Indian
gaming, and when ultimately passed, provided the first regulatory scheme for
Indian gaming in the United States.  The initial legislation was introduced in
the Senate on February 19, 1987,53 just six days before the Supreme Court
decided Cabazon,54 reflecting the increasing need at that time to address the
growing issues with Indian gaming.
The purpose behind the IGRA was not only to establish a statutory scheme
for self-regulation, but also to prevent “organized crime or criminal elements in
46 Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207-08 (citations omitted).  The Court noted that “Indian Country”
was defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151, and included “all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issu-
ance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation.” Id. at 207
n.5 (quoting DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427, n.2 (1975)).
47 Id. at 208 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1976)).
48 Id. (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 387 (1976)).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 209-10. Here, the Court found that California did not “prohibit all forms of gam-
bling[,]” but in fact “daily encourage[d] its citizens to participate” in the state lottery, itself
“state-run gambling.” Id. at 210.  In reaching its holding, the Court noted the “distinction
between state ‘criminal/prohibitory’ laws and state ‘civil/regulatory’ laws: if the intent of a
state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 280’s grant of crimi-
nal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regula-
tion, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its
enforcement on an Indian reservation.” Id. at 209.
51 Sean Brewer, Note, Analysis of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in Light of Current
Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 469-470 (1995) (citations omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
52 Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988)).
53 Bill Summary & Status, 100th Cong. (1987 – 1988), S.555 Cosponsors, U.S. Library of
Cong. THOMAS Cong. bill history, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d100:SN00555:
@@@P (last visited on Jan. 9, 2011).  The bill was introduced by Senators Dan K. Inouye of
Hawaii, Thomas A. Daschle of South Dakota, Daniel J. Evans of Washington, and Larry
Pressler of South Dakota. Id.
54 Cabazon was decided on February 25, 1987. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202.
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Indian gaming activities.”55  In its Senate Report, the Select Committee on
Indian Affairs (the “Committee”) noted that the Justice Department initially
opposed the creation of a federal regulatory agency to regulate gaming activi-
ties on Indian reservations, arguing that such regulation could be enforced by
individual states.56  In response, the Committee pointed out that state regulation
of Indian gaming would contravene well-established principles of Indian sover-
eignty.57  The Senate Report also expressed the Justice Department’s objec-
tions over giving Indian tribes the power of self-regulatory authority over their
gaming activities, without restraints or limitations that could potentially run
afoul of individual state laws with respect to gaming.58  Notwithstanding these
concerns, Congress passed the IGRA, affirming that gaming provided Indian
tribes a means of “promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency,
and strong tribal governments.”59
The IGRA’s statutory framework provides for three classification levels of
Indian gaming,60 with each class subject to different regulations and oversight.
Class I gaming consists of “social games solely for prizes of minimal value or
traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in
connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.”61  Put another way, a gam-
ing activity falls under Class I if the tribe conducts the activity—such as
rodeos, horse races, or games with prizes—in conjunction with traditional
Indian ceremonies or celebrations, such as pow-wows or feasts.  These types of
gaming activities are exclusively managed and regulated by the respective
Indian tribe engaged in such gaming operations,62 thus removed from external
tribe regulation,63 something that is optimal to tribes striving for tribal self-
determination.
Class II gaming encompasses card games and bingo-like games such as
“pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, [and] instant bingo,”64 but expressly
precludes “baccarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack[.]”65  Gaming within this clas-
sification is still within the tribe’s purview; however, the National Indian Gam-
ing Commission provides some oversight.66
Class III gaming is somewhat of a “catch-all” provision, covering any
gaming activity not specifically addressed in Class I or II gaming.67  This cate-
gory of gaming is generally comprised of the more lucrative types of gaming
activities such as slot machines, banking card games,68 and animal racing.69
55 S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 5 (1988); but see, Additional Views of Mr. McCain, noting that
in fifteen years of Indian gaming there was not one clear case of crime on Indian reserva-
tions. Id. at 33.
56 Id. at 5.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 23.
59 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2006).
60 Id. § 2703.
61 Id. § 2703(6).
62 Id. § 2710(a)(1).
63 S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 11.
64 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(a)(i)(III) (2006).
65 Id. § 2703(7)(b)(i).
66 S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 7.
67 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (2006).
68 Banking card games are games where players play against each other and/or the house.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG205.txt unknown Seq: 9 10-JAN-12 16:07
Fall 2011] WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN 263
Under the IGRA, Class III gaming is solely authorized on Indian land to the
extent that the respective state does not prohibit such types of gaming.70
The IGRA also compels states to negotiate with Indian tribes when a tribe
applies for Class III gaming.  In order to obtain authorization for Class III gam-
ing, the tribe must enter into a compact (or agreement) with the state in which
the reservation is located regarding the tribe’s possible gaming operations.71
The state must negotiate the compact with the tribe in good faith.72  This com-
pact may address a variety of different topics, such as choice of law between
state or tribal law,73 allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the
state and tribe necessary to enforce such laws and regulations,74 or remedies for
breach of contract.75  The IGRA is particularly useful to Indian tribes seeking
to engage in Class III gaming because tribes may sue a state in federal court if
the state refuses to negotiate with the tribe or participates in bad faith.76  These
provisions reinforce a tribe’s probability of entering into a tribal-state compact,
and by extension, authorization to conduct Class III gaming on its land.
The IGRA also established the National Indian Gaming Commission
(“NIGC”).77  The NIGC has expansive regulatory authority over Indian gaming
activities on reservations.78  This includes, but is not limited to: monitoring
Class II gaming conducted on Indian land;79 inspecting and examining Indian
reservations where Class II gaming is conducted;80 conducting background
investigations;81 having access to, inspecting, and examining papers, books,
and records with respect to Class II gaming;82 entering into contracts with the
federal government as necessary to perform NIGC duties;83 holding hearings
and taking testimony as necessary;84 and promulgating regulations and guide-
lines to uphold IGRA provisions.85  As previously stated, the NIGC exclusively
oversees Class II gaming on Indian reservations.86  In this respect, the NIGC
serves as the internal regulatory authority for tribes engaged in Class II gaming.
The NIGC’s requirement that two of its three members be members of a feder-
ally recognized Indian tribe emphasizes the concept of self-regulation.87
69 S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 7.
70 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2006).
71 See id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
72 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
73 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i).
74 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(ii).
75 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(v).
76 Id. § 2710(7)(A)(i).
77 Id. § 2704(a).
78 S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 7 (1988).
79 25 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1) (2006).
80 Id. § 2706(b)(2).
81 Id. § 2706(b)(3).
82 Id. § 2706(b)(4).
83 Id. § 2706(b)(7).
84 Id. § 2706(b)(8).
85 Id. § 2706(b)(10).
86 Id. §§ 2706(b)(1), 2710(a)(2).
87 25 U.S.C § 2704(b)(3) (2006).  The current acting Chairwoman is Tracie Stevens, a
member of the Tulalip Tribes of Washington. See Commissioners, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING
COMM’N, http://www.nigc.gov/About_Us/Commissioners.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
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Consequently, pursuant to the provisions of the IGRA, states are presented
with formidable challenges in opposing an Indian tribe’s desire to conduct
gaming operations on its reservation.  Under the IGRA, a state has no authority
over Class I or Class II gaming activities on Indian reservations;88 tribes may
freely engage in those types of gaming activities without state regulation.
Moreover, even in compact discussions with an Indian tribe in regards to Class
III gaming, the state carries the burden to prove that it engaged in good faith
negotiations.89  Because of this wide latitude to tribes, the IGRA has proved to
be a very valuable tool for Indian tribes seeking economic independence and
viability with respect to Indian gaming.
III. ENTER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: DO INSOLVENT INDIAN TRIBES HAVE
A PLACE IN THE CODE TO OBTAIN RELIEF?
Determining whether casinos owned and operated by Indian tribes may
file for bankruptcy protection under federal law is like trying to fit a square peg
in a round hole.  At first blush, the two subjects – an Indian casino owned and
operated by an Indian tribe and the United States Bankruptcy Code – seem
incongruous to one another because it is unclear whether an Indian tribe has the
ability to file for bankruptcy under federal law, given its status as a sovereign
nation within the United States.
A. From Past to Present: A (Relatively) Brief History of U.S. Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy seemingly pervades American businesses and individual con-
sumerism.  In 2010, there were over a million and a half bankruptcy filings
(business and non-business) in the United States.90  Although bankruptcy may
continue to be heavily stigmatized in other countries,91 in the United States the
ability to file for bankruptcy provides the financially distressed a metaphorical
lifesaver from drowning in the sea of insolvency.
The concept of bankruptcy is firmly rooted in the Constitution, which
states that Congress shall establish “[l]aws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States.”92  In spite of this, Congress did not pass a fed-
eral bankruptcy statute until 1800, and even then, the law was temporary and
was primarily passed to address an economic depression pervading the country
at the time.93  In fact, the 1800 Act turned out to be short-lived; Congress
88 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1), (a)(2) (2006).
89 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
90 U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2010, AM. BANKR. INST., http://www.abiworld.org/AM/
AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=63164&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDis-
play.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
91 See Erin K. Healy, Note, All’s Fair in Love and Bankruptcy? Analysis of the Property
Requirement for Section 109 Eligibility and its Effect on Foreign Debtors Filing in U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 535, 542 (2004), noting that “[w]hile a
bankruptcy filing in other countries continues to carry significant stigma, U.S. companies
and individuals are not subjected to the same shame merely as a result of filing a petition for
bankruptcy.”
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
93 David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical Analysis of Insolvency Laws and
Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdiction of Today’s United States Bankruptcy
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repealed it after only three years.94  This first bankruptcy law also did not
afford bankruptcy relief to all Americans – it essentially addressed commercial
debts involving “traders, merchants, underwriters, and brokers,” and was
strictly involuntary,95 meaning that creditors initiated bankruptcy against the
debtor on its behalf.
The next two federal bankruptcy statutes passed by Congress suffered sim-
ilarly short-lived fates.  Congress passed the next federal bankruptcy law in
1841, and although it too was short-lived in duration, it provided some impor-
tant advances in American bankruptcy.96  The 1841 Act began to “de-criminal-
ize” bankruptcy by abolishing debtor’s prisons, expanded the availability of
bankruptcy protections from just traders, merchants, underwriters, and brokers
to all types of debtors, and for the first time, allowed debtors to voluntarily seek
bankruptcy relief.97  Nonetheless, Congress repealed the law in 1843 after just
eighteen months in response to political pressure.98
Facing a severe economic depression following the end of the American
Civil War and a changing financial landscape, Congress once again passed
another federal bankruptcy statute in 1867.99  At that time, a national American
economy had begun to slowly emerge,100 and with it, a need to address debt
collection on a national level rather than state-by-state regulation.  The 1867
Act officially charged federal district courts as courts of bankruptcy and estab-
lished “registers in bankruptcy”—administrative positions created to assist the
district courts with bankruptcy proceedings.101  In 1874, Congress undertook
amendments to the 1867 Act, and importantly, established the basic precursor
of reorganization laws.102  For the first time, the debtor retained his property
and proposed a plan to repay his creditors for less than the whole amount owed
on his debts.103  If the debtor obtained the requisite approval from the majority
of his creditors, he received a discharge of his debts, which also bound all of
the debtor’s named creditors.104  Despite these advances in bankruptcy law, in
1878, Congress once again repealed the federal bankruptcy law due to allega-
tions of excessive fees and abusive conduct by creditors.105
Court and its Judicial Officers, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 165, 170-171 (2000) [hereinafter
Kennedy].  The law had a five-year maximum time cap.
94 Id. at 171 (citing CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 21
(1935)).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 171-172.
97 Id. (citing Arnold M. Quittner, Overview: History of the Bankruptcy Code and Prior
Bankruptcy Laws, 585 PLI/Comm. 7 (1991)).
98 Id. (citing Arnold M. Quittner, Overview: History of the Bankruptcy Code and Prior
Bankruptcy Laws, 585 PLI/Comm. 7 (1991)).
99 Id. at 172.
100 Id.
101 Id. (citing Charles J. Tabb, The History of The Bankruptcy Laws in The United States, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995)).
102 Id. at 173 (citing Charles J. Tabb, The History of The Bankruptcy Laws in The United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 20 (1995)).
103 Id.
104 Id. (citing Charles J. Tabb, The History of The Bankruptcy Laws in The United States, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 21 (1995)).
105 Id. at 173-174.
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Amid a changing economic national landscape that moved away from
agriculture and towards industrialization, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898.106  This law established the basic framework for the current bank-
ruptcy system by affording bankruptcy relief to individuals and businesses and
expanding the role of “bankruptcy referees.”107  The antecedents of current
bankruptcy judges, referees were charged with the administrative oversight of
bankruptcy cases.108  Under the 1898 Act, referees acted with authority to
“adjudicate debtors as bankrupts, dismiss cases, examine witnesses, declare
dividends, examine schedules and order amendments thereof, give notice of
certain proceedings to creditors, and generally to attend to the detail of admin-
istration[.]”109  Unlike the position of registers under the 1867 Act, the posi-
tions of referees remained in place for the next eighty years, until Congress’
next major overhaul of bankruptcy law in 1978.  Although there were move-
ments to repeal the 1898 Act, in contrast to previous bankruptcy acts, such
efforts proved to be unsuccessful.110  Rather than completely repeal the 1898
Act, Congress instead chose to amend the law over the years.  For example, in
1938 Congress passed the Chandler Act, legislation which substantively
revamped, but did not expressly repeal, the 1898 Act.111  Notably, the Chandler
Act established the current structure of “chapters” in bankruptcy,112 creating
sections within the bankruptcy statute to separate the different types of
bankruptcy.
As the twentieth century progressed and the number of consumer bank-
ruptcies rose, Congress began facing mounting pressure to amend the bank-
ruptcy laws again.  Despite periodic Congressional amendments to the 1898
Act, the bankruptcy law in place in the mid-twentieth century was outdated,
and bankruptcy referees were ill-equipped to administratively handle the rising
number of cases.113  In response, Congress commissioned studies and con-
ducted hearings on bankruptcy reform, and created the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in 1970.114  Separately, bankruptcy
referees banded together and lobbied Congress to amend the bankruptcy
laws.115
After several years of studies and recommendations, political wrangling,
and numerous legislative hearings and revisions, the ninety-fifth Congress
passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.116  Completely replacing the 1898
106 Id. at 174-175.
107 Id. at 175.
108 Id. at 176.
109 Id.
110 The Hon. Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”: What Does
That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 291 (1999) (citations omitted).
111 Id. at 291-92 (citing Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978)).
112 Kennedy, supra note 93, at 176.
113 Id. at 177.
114 Id.
115 See The Hon. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Pas-
sage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978; Part One: Outside Looking In, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1,
14 (2007).
116 The Hon. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978; Part Five: Inside the White House, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 175,
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Bankruptcy Act, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provided a much needed
and meaningful overhaul of federal bankruptcy law in the United States.  This
legislation established Title 11 of the United States Code and the Bankruptcy
Code in its current form (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”).  The new and
improved Code provided for separate bankruptcy courts; that is, courts that are
units of federal district courts, but not adjuncts to district courts as once con-
templated.117  Even more importantly, under the new Code, bankruptcy courts
were given broad jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising under Title 11
or arising under or related to cases under Title 11.”118  The Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 also gave bankruptcy courts original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction
over proceedings arising under the Code.119
This expanse of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts was relatively short-
lived; just four years later, the Supreme Court struck down this expanded juris-
diction in the seminal bankruptcy case, Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co.120  The Court determined that the legislative grant of
jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts in the Code was unconstitutional on the
grounds that it conferred the jurisdictional authority of an Article III court to
non-Article III judges.121  This issue was subsequently resolved when Congress
passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,122
which amended the Code and Title 28, among other things, with respect to
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.
Under the amended structure, which remains the current system, district
courts possess original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases,123 but essentially
share jurisdiction of bankruptcy proceedings with bankruptcy courts.124  Under
this construct, in most jurisdictions there is a global or standing “reference” by
the district court to the bankruptcy court with respect to bankruptcy proceed-
ings.125  Accordingly, bankruptcy proceedings are, as a matter of course, heard
by the bankruptcy court.  However, the district court may withdraw the refer-
ence from the bankruptcy court as to a bankruptcy proceeding at any time “for
cause shown.”126
193 (2008).  The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is enacted at Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (1978).
117 See The Hon. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Pas-
sage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978; Part Three: On the Hill, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 364
(2007).
118 Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bank-
ruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 649 (2008) (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 241(a), § 1471(b)-(c), 92 Stat. 2549, 2668).
119 Kennedy, supra note 93, at 178 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a), (b), and (c)).
120 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
121 Id. at 87.
122 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333, 333 (1984).
123 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006).
124 Id. § 1334(a)-(b)(providing in relevant part that “. . .district courts shall have original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or
related to cases under title 11.”).
125 See id. § 157(a).
126 Id. § 157(d). Moreover, in certain situations, the district court must withdraw the refer-
ence. See id. (providing that “[t]he district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so with-
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The 1984 Amendment also established a non-exclusive list of “core pro-
ceedings” in 28 U.S.C. § 157.127  Pursuant to this statute, bankruptcy courts
may enter orders and judgments in core proceedings arising under or arising in
a case under the Code.128  If the matter is deemed to be a “non-core” proceed-
ing, the bankruptcy court has less power to enter orders and judgments; instead,
the bankruptcy court makes proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which the court submits to district court for a final order.129
As its history would dictate, the Code did not remain static for long.  Con-
gress recently amended the Code when it passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.130  This law, or BAPCPA as it is
commonly referred to, has provided the most significant amendments to bank-
ruptcy law since the Code was enacted in 1978.131  Similar to previous move-
ments for bankruptcy reform, BAPCPA was the culmination of several years of
legislative discussion and hearings.132  One of Congress’s primary purposes in
enacting BAPCPA was to curb the perceived notion of abusive Chapter 7 con-
sumer filings.133  Accordingly, one of the most significant changes imple-
mented by BAPCPA was the “means test” imposed on consumer debtors
seeking to file for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7.134  This test begins by
examining whether individuals seeking to file for bankruptcy under chapter 7
fall below the median income for households in the state in which they reside.
If the individual falls below the state median income, he or she is eligible to file
for Chapter 7 and does not need to complete the means test.135  However, if the
individual’s income is above the state median income, the individual must meet
the means test to be eligible for Chapter 7; otherwise, the filing is considered
presumptively abusive.136  Thus, the means test pushes debtors into reorganiza-
tion chapters such as Chapter 13 (or sometimes, Chapter 11).  The means test is
calculated using a formula that takes into account the individual’s monthly dis-
posable income less certain expenses.137  As illustrated by the means test,
BAPCPA imposed stringent requirements on consumers looking to file
bankruptcy.
Despite the evolution of federal bankruptcy law in the past century, there
is no mention of how or if these laws pertain to Native Americans in the con-
draw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires
consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or
activities affecting interstate commerce.”).
127 Id. § 157(b)(2)(A)-(P).
128 Id.
129 Id. § 157(c)(1).
130 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23, 23 (2005).
131 Bruce M. Price and Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: An Empirical Analysis of
the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (And Some Unintended Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 135, 136 (2007) [hereinafter Price].
132 Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 487 (2005).
133 Price, supra note 132, at 165 (citing Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005)).
134 Id. at 166 (citations omitted).
135 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7)(A)-(B) (2006).
136 See id. § 707(b)(2) (i).
137 See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv).
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text of tribal insolvency.  Although the 1898 Bankruptcy Act referred to the
“term ‘Indian territory’ in section 1(24)[,] [ ] Congress failed to include the
term in subsequent bankruptcy acts, and no explanation exists regarding this
omission of the term in the 1978 version of the Code or its subsequent revi-
sions.”138  Moreover, Congress has had ample opportunity to address tribal eli-
gibility under the Code.  Following its passage of the IGRA in 1988, Congress
has had at least seventeen years preceding BAPCPA to address the issue.  Not-
withstanding this opportunity, the Code remains silent on the issue of Indian
tribes and bankruptcy eligibility.  This may be partly attributable to the fact that
until the Great Recession,139 tribal gaming operations had financially thrived,
and consequently, there had been no real need for tribes to seek bankruptcy
relief.  Although there is some case authority that addresses bankruptcy juris-
diction over Native Americans and tribes,140 these cases primarily address situ-
ations where Native Americans are creditors rather than debtors.
B. Are Tribes Eligible to File as Debtors Under the Code?
For purposes of discussing an Indian tribe’s eligibility to file for bank-
ruptcy, this section addresses debtor eligibility in the context of the tribe as the
filing entity (and not its gaming operations/casino filing as a separate business
entity, such as a limited liability company).141  Section 109142 of the Code pro-
vides the starting statutory basis for debtor eligibility, delineating a list of
acceptable types of debtors and corresponding bankruptcy chapters available to
that type of debtor.143  For example, this section specifies that a Chapter 7
debtor may not be a railroad, bank (foreign or domestic), or insurance company
(foreign or domestic).144  At the outset, Section 109 provides that only a person
138 Clift, supra note 7, at 221 (citing In re Sandmar Corp., 12 B.R. 910, 913 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1981)).
139 See Rampell, supra note 2.
140
 See In re Sandmar, 12 B.R. 910 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981); In re Shape, 25 B.R. 356
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1982).
141 There has been at least one case in which an Indian tribe’s business entity, but not the
tribe itself, filed for bankruptcy protection.  In 2008, Greektown Casino, L.L.C., doing busi-
ness as the Greektown Casino in Detroit, Michigan, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy along
with related business entities in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division.  Kewadin Greektown Casino, L.L.C., one of the related business entities,
is owned by an entity (the Kewadin Casinos Gaming Authority) that is in turn owned by the
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians. See First Day Motion For Entry Of An Order
Directing Joint Administration Of The Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases, at 2-5, In re Greektown
Holdings, LLC, No. 08-53104 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 30, 2008).  The case is being jointly
administered with Greektown Casino, L.L.C. (“Greektown Casino”) Case No. 08-53106;
Kewadin Greektown Casino, L.L.C. (“Kewadin”) Case No. 08-53105; Monroe Partners,
L.L.C. (“Monroe”) Case No. 08-53107; Greektown Holdings II, Inc. (“Holdings II”) Case
No. 08 53108; Contract Builders Corporation (“Builders”) Case No. 08- 53110; Realty
Equity Company, Inc. (“Realty”) Case No. 08-53112; and Trappers GC Partner, L.L.C.
(“Trappers”) Case No. 08-53111.  First Day Order For Joint Administration at 2-3, In re
Greektown Holdings, L.L.C., No. 08-53104 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. June 13, 2008).
142 All references to “Section” herein will be to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101, et
seq., unless otherwise indicated.
143 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
144 Id. § 109(b)(1)-(3).
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or municipality may be a debtor under the Code.145  In turn, Section 101 pro-
vides a laundry list of definitions for terms found throughout the Code,
although this list is by no means exhaustive.146  Thus, the Code defines “per-
son” as an “individual, partnership, [or] corporation,” excluding certain govern-
mental units.147  The Code defines “municipality” as a “political subdivision or
public agency or instrumentality of a State.”148  This is congruent with the
Code’s definition of a debtor under Section 101, which provides that the term
“debtor” refers to a person or municipality.149  Therefore, the next relevant
inquiry is whether an Indian tribe constitutes a person or municipality for the
purposes of filing bankruptcy under the Code.
To qualify as a municipality for the purposes of eligibility, a tribe must be
a political subdivision, public agency, or instrumentality of a State.  The Code’s
definition of a State does not expressly articulate that it is in reference to a state
of the United States, but simply that it “includes the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under
chapter 9 of this title.”150  Chapter 9 of the Code refers to the specific chapter
solely available to municipalities seeking bankruptcy relief.  Although not
explicitly stated, it is reasonable to infer that the Code’s definition of a State
refers to a state of the United States.
The Code also does not define the term “instrumentality,” although one
bankruptcy court has recently conducted an in-depth analysis on this term for
the purposes of determining a municipality under the Code.151  In In re Las
Vegas Monorail Company, the debtor owned and operated a monorail train
along the Strip, the hotel-casino corridor along Las Vegas Boulevard in Las
Vegas, Nevada.152  Pursuant to a somewhat convoluted financing arrangement,
the debtor ultimately received loans in the form of municipal bonds to finance
construction of the train.153  Upon the debtor’s filing of its bankruptcy, one of
its creditors sought to dismiss the debtor’s chapter 11 case, arguing that the
debtor was a municipality and thus, ineligible to file for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11.154
After reviewing the legislative history and relevant case law, the bank-
ruptcy court determined that there were three distinct yet interrelated character-
istics to consider in determining whether an entity was an instrumentality for
the purposes of chapter 9: (i) whether the entity engaged in governmental func-
tions, such as sovereign immunity, the ability to tax, or the ability to take land
under eminent domain; (ii) whether the entity had a public purpose, and if so,
how much control the state exerted over the entity; and (iii) whether the state
itself treated the entity as an instrumentality of the state.155  Under this context,
145 Id. § 109(a).
146 Id. § 101.
147 Id. § 101(41).
148 Id. § 101(40).
149 Id. § 101(13).
150 Id. § 101(52).
151 See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
152 Id. at 773.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 774.
155 Id. at 788 (citations omitted).
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the court found that the debtor did not exercise any traditional governmental
functions,156 the state of Nevada exercised little to no control over the debtor’s
daily operations,157 and the state did not treat the debtor as an instrumentality
under Nevada law.158
Under the Las Vegas Monorail analysis, a strong argument can be made
that an Indian tribe is an instrumentality of the federal government.  However,
reverting back to the definition provided by the Code, to constitute as an instru-
mentality for the purposes of eligibility as a municipality, the qualifying factor
is being a “political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a
State.”159  Even if a tribe is considered an instrumentality of the federal gov-
ernment, tribes are not instrumentalities of states, as conceptually expounded
by the Marshall Trilogy and subsequent case law.160  Similarly, Indian tribes do
not qualify as political subdivisions of a state because a tribe is not a city under
a state;161 nor does a tribe constitute a public agency of a state because a tribe
is not an entity that provides services to the public on behalf of the state.  Under
this analysis, an Indian tribe does not constitute a municipality under the Code
because it is not a subdivision or instrumentality of a state government.
Accordingly, the only other viable option for an Indian tribe to qualify as a
debtor is to meet the requirements of a “person” under the Code.
As previously stated, for the purposes of qualifying as a debtor, the Code
defines a “person” as an individual, partnership, or corporation, with the exclu-
sion of certain governmental units.  The Code does not expressly define the
terms “individual” or “partnership.”162  However, it is inferred that the term
“individual” literally means a human being, particularly in the context of other
definitions describing this term under Section 101.  For example, the Historical
and Statutory Notes to Section 101 state that the term “Individual with Regular
Income” refers to “individuals on welfare, social security, fixed pension
incomes, or who live on investment incomes, [who] will be able to work out
repayment plans with their creditors rather than being forced into straight bank-
ruptcy.”163  This supports the inference that an “individual” is a human being
because entities cannot receive welfare, social security, or income from pen-
sions.  Applying this logic to an Indian tribe, it is unlikely that a tribe would be
eligible as an individual as contemplated under the Code because a tribe is not a
human being.164
Similarly, although undefined by the Code, the term “partnership” is liber-
ally referenced in the definitions of assorted business terms in Section 101.
There exists various types of legal partnerships; however, Black’s Law Diction-
156 Id. at 795-96 (citations omitted).
157 Id. at 797.
158 Id. at 800.
159 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2006) (emphasis added), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Cor-
rections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3557 (2010).
160 See Fromherz, supra note 12, at 155-58, 170, 179 (citations omitted).
161 See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 775 (determining that the debtor was not
a political subdivision, such as a county or city).
162 See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3557 (2010).
163 Id.
164 See id.
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ary defines “partnership” as a “voluntary association of two or more persons
who jointly own and carry on a business for profit.”165  Under this context, it is
unlikely that a tribe would be eligible as a partnership since the term inherently
infers a plural number of partners, whereas an Indian tribe itself is a single
entity.  In addition, although a tribe is comprised of more than one member, it
is not fundamentally a group of people fiscally invested in a business.  This
notion is supported by the IGRA, which currently requires that the federal gov-
ernment individually recognize tribes166 and each tribe independently apply for
authorization to engage in Class III gaming operations.167  Thus, an Indian tribe
would likely not qualify to be a debtor as a partnership.
Unlike the terms “individual” and “partnership,” the Code actually pro-
vides a definition of “corporation.”  The Code broadly defines this as including
associations, joint stock companies, unincorporated companies or associations,
or business trusts, but excludes limited partnerships.168  To qualify as a debtor
under the corporation definition, an association must have the same “power or
privilege” of a private corporation.169  Thus, generally speaking, the central
inquiry in determining whether an entity is a corporation for the purposes of
debtor eligibility is whether the entity conducting business activity legally
obtains some degree of protection from liability.170  In this context, it seems
unlikely that an Indian tribe would fit the description of a corporation as
defined by the Code.  Although both the Code and the Historical and Statutory
Notes to Section 101 indicate that entities need not be incorporated under state
law to qualify as a corporation,171 an Indian tribe itself is not an entity formed
to conduct or engage in business activities with some degree of limited liability.
Tribes may, of course, form corporations or limited liability companies to sepa-
rately run their gaming businesses; however, the tribe itself does not constitute
a corporation as defined by the Code.
Last, with few exceptions, the Code expressly excludes a “governmental
unit” from its definition of “person.”172  A governmental unit does not qualify
as a “person” for the purposes of being eligible to be a debtor under the
Code.173  Instead, the governmental unit must qualify as a municipality to qual-
ify as a debtor.  The Code provides a broad definition of a governmental unit,
including the United States and its political subdivisions, such as states, com-
monwealths, districts, territories, departments, agencies or any instrumentali-
165 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (9th ed. 2009).
166 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2703(5) (2006).
167 See Id. § 2710(d)(1) (listing the requirements necessary for an Indian tribe to gain
authorization to conduct Class III gaming on its reservation).
168 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (2006).
169 Id. § 101(9)(A)(i).
170 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 101.09 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2010) (noting that “[t]he degree of protection from liability will determine
whether the entity is a corporation under the definition in section 101.  If the protection is
more like that given to corporate shareholders, the entity is more likely to be found to meet
the Codes definition of ‘corporation.’  If the protection is more limited, the entity is likely to
be found to be a partnership under section 101.”).
171 11 U.S.C. § 101(9), HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES, Revision Notes and Legisla-
tive Reports, 1978 Acts.
172 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2006).
173 Id. § 101(9).
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ties.174  But the definition also provides a catch-all, encompassing any “other
foreign or domestic government.”175  At least one article has recently opined
that an Indian tribe may be excluded from filing for bankruptcy on the basis
that tribes are governmental units.176  Case authority addressing Indian sover-
eign immunity and waiver of this immunity has generally concluded that tribes
are governmental units as contemplated under Section 101 of the Code.177  For
example, in Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit held that
Congress abrogated the sovereign immunity of tribes under Section 106178 of
the Code,179 and thus, the debtor could institute an adversary proceeding under
its bankruptcy case against an Indian tribe.180  The court expressly determined
that Indian tribes were domestic governments of the United States.181  Based on
this determination, the court concluded that the tribes’ immunity was abrogated
under Section 106 because Congress provided for abrogation from immunity
with respect to foreign and domestic governments under Section 106.182  How-
ever, courts have typically made these types of decisions within the context of
waiver and sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 106, and not explicitly on
the question of whether a tribe is precluded from eligibility as a debtor under
the Code because it is a domestic government.183  Thus, because the Code does
not expressly include an Indian tribe in its definition of a governmental unit,
and case law has not expressly held that tribes are domestic governments for
the specific purpose of debtor eligibility, it remains unclear whether an Indian
tribe is in fact precluded from qualifying as debtor under this basis.
C. If Tribes are Eligible to file as Debtors Under the Code, Under What
Chapter Can They File?
Thus far, the analysis of an Indian tribe’s eligibility to file for bankruptcy
under Section 109 of the Code seemingly indicates that tribes are ineligible to
file as debtors – that is, an Indian tribe does not qualify to be a debtor either as
a person or municipality, and in fact may be precluded from filing altogether
because it meets the definition of a governmental unit.  However, assuming
arguendo that a tribe in fact met the eligibility requirements to file for bank-
ruptcy, the next step would be determining the type of bankruptcy the tribe
could seek relief under.  The Code provides for six different types of bank-
ruptcy relief depending on the nature of debtor and debt involved.  While some
174 Id. § 101(27).
175 Id.
176 Steven T. Waterman, Tribal Troubles—Without Bankruptcy Relief, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Dec.2009-Jan. 2010, at 44, 87.
177 Id. (citing Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 871 (2004)).
178 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) abrogates sovereign immunity of governmental units with respect to
various subsections of the Code. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006), amended by
Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3557 (2010).
179 Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 871 (2004).
180 See id. at 1056.
181 Id. at 1058.
182 Id. at 1059.
183 Waterman, supra note 176, at 87.
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chapters of bankruptcy under the Code are broadly applicable to debtors and
widely used by both consumers and businesses, other chapters of bankruptcy
are very specific to the type of debtor and debt involved, and therefore, not as
frequently filed.  Filings may also be driven by regional jurisdiction.  For
example, a Chapter 12 filing, which exclusively deals with family farmers and
fishermen, may not be prevalent in the state of Nevada, but may be commonly
filed in the Midwest region.  Because some chapters of bankruptcy are by defi-
nition inapplicable to an Indian tribe, this section will not address a tribe’s
ability of filing for bankruptcy under Chapters 9,184 12,185 13,186 or 15.187
Instead, this section will briefly examine the common chapters of bankruptcy
relief – Chapters 7 and 11– and address the possibility of an Indian tribe filing
for bankruptcy relief under those respective chapters.188
1. Chapter 7 – Liquidation
Chapter 7 is the chapter under the Code that primarily governs the liquida-
tion of a debtor’s assets.189  Broadly speaking, in chapter 7, an appointed trus-
184 Chapter 9, titled “Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality,” applies to municipalities
seeking relief under bankruptcy.  Under this chapter, a municipality is essentially permitted
to reorganize its debts. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 901 (2005) - 946 (2006).  As previously
discussed, an Indian tribe likely does not qualify as a municipality because it is not a politi-
cal subdivision, public agency, or instrumentality of a state.  Thus, by definition this chapter
is not available to an Indian tribe as a basis for filing bankruptcy.
185 Chapter 12, titled “Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or Fisherman with Regular
Annual Income,” is applicable only to two types of debtors: a family farmer with a regular
annual income or a family fisherman with regular annual income. See generally 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1231 (2006).  Family farmers and family fisherman are defined in 11 U.S.C
§ 101(18), (19), (19A) and (19B), respectively.  An Indian tribe as an entity does not meet
the definition of either of these types of debtors.  Thus, by definition this chapter is not
available to an Indian tribe as a basis for filing bankruptcy.
186 Chapter 13, titled “Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income,” is appli-
cable only to individual debtors. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2006).  As previ-
ously discussed, although the Code does not expressly define the term “individual,” it is
appropriate to infer the common language meaning of the term, thereby referring to a human
being.  To that end, non-human entities such as corporations and partnerships are precluded
from filing for bankruptcy under this chapter.  Thus, because an Indian tribe is also a non-
human entity, by definition this chapter is not available to an Indian tribe as a basis for filing
bankruptcy.
187 Chapter 15, titled “Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases,” is a relatively new chapter
of bankruptcy, officially added to the Code via BAPCPA in 2005 (although it had a prede-
cessor under Section 304 of the Code in 1978).  This chapter addresses “cross-border” bank-
ruptcy proceedings, that is, bankruptcy proceedings commenced in other countries or
involving foreign proceedings.  This chapter essentially requires some sort of foreign insol-
vency proceeding or foreign country seeking the assistance of the United States in a foreign
proceeding. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1532 (2006).  Because an Indian tribe’s bank-
ruptcy would not, by definition, constitute a foreign proceeding, this chapter is not available
to an Indian tribe as a basis for filing bankruptcy.
188 It should be noted that the Code is expansive.  The case law addressing just one subsec-
tion in the Code can be complex and lengthy.  Similarly, law review articles may be devoted
to one subsection, or even a paragraph, of the Code.  Therefore, this section is not intended
to provide a substantive analysis of these chapters, but instead give an overview with perti-
nent application to Indian tribes.
189 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 700.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th
ed. 2010) (however, liquidation of the debtor’s assets may also occur under some of the
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tee typically collects the debtor’s assets, if any, and liquidates the debtor’s
assets by sale.  After payment of legal and administrative expenses, the trustee
distributes any proceeds from this sale to the debtor’s creditors in order of
priority.  Individuals and businesses may file for bankruptcy under this chapter,
although there are some significant differences in treatment with respect to both
types of debtors.  For example, only individual debtors may obtain a discharge
from bankruptcy under chapter 7.190  That is to say, if an individual debtor
completes the requirements under chapter 7 and the individual debtor obtains a
discharge from the bankruptcy court, notwithstanding any other issues barring
discharge or re-affirmation of debts, the debtor’s liability on pre-bankruptcy
debts is extinguished.
On the other hand, a business is ineligible to receive a discharge under
chapter 7 because under a chapter 7 filing, a business ceases to exist.191
Although a business may file for bankruptcy under chapter 7 and have the
appointed trustee liquidate its assets for the benefit of the creditor, the business
does not receive a “fresh start” like an individual debtor; instead, the chapter 7
bankruptcy generally results in the wind-up of the business.  Moreover, only if
the debtor is an individual may the debtor claim exemptions to property.
Exempt property is not subject to liquidation,192 and therefore, the debtor is
generally able to retain exempt property.  Although the Code provides a list of
exemptions available to debtors, states are given the ability to “opt-out” and
establish their own exemption laws.  Thus, debtors may be statutorily required
to claim their exemptions under state law.
If an Indian tribe were to file for bankruptcy under chapter 7, an appointed
trustee would generally liquidate the tribe’s assets, including real property.
Although a tribe does not constitute an individual, and thus does not have the
ability to claim exemptions to property, the tribe possesses special status by the
federal government with respect to its land.  Consequently, it is unclear whether
a third party, such as an appointed trustee, would have the ability to alienate
Indian land through liquidation without Congressional approval.  Congress has
historically enacted laws and treaties imposing various restrictions on the alien-
ation of Indian lands.193  As it currently stands, 25 U.S.C. § 177 precludes the
conveyance of Indian lands without Congressional approval.194  Practically
other bankruptcy chapters, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 1222(b)(8), and 1322
(2006)).
190 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2006).
191 Id.
192 Exempt property, however, is still subject to foreclosure by a creditor who is secured by
a lien against the property.  The amount of exemption varies state-by-state.
193 Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411, 411 (1830) (essentially codifying the doctrine
of discovery, requiring the authorization of the federal government to alienate Indian land).
See also Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) (citations
omitted); Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985 (1934) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1934)) (providing that the Secretary of the Department of
the Interior may place land into trusts on behalf of Indian tribes, which entails tribes to
special status on the land, such as exemption from the imposition of state property taxes).
194 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006).  This statute codifies the Indian Nonintercourse Act, titled “An
Act to regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes,” which was first passed by
Congress in 1790, 1st Cong., Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).  However, the first Act expired after
two years, which Congress remedied by passing the second Act in 1793.  2d Cong., Ch. 19, 1
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speaking, there appears to be some ambiguity as to whether this statute applies
with equal force to land held by tribes in fee simple absolute title, as opposed to
land held in trust by the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, and thus
protected by the federal government.195
Assuming that land held by Indian tribes in fee simple absolute is de facto
exempt from Congressional approval to sell, the chapter 7 trustee would need
to determine whether the land was under federal protection or held in fee sim-
ple absolute.  If the trustee determined that the land was in fact federally pro-
tected and therefore restricted, the trustee would then need to obtain approval
from the federal government to liquidate the land.  This in turn would create
extraordinary legal and administrative hurdles for the trustee and, by extension,
the bankruptcy court, far beyond that of a typical chapter 7 bankruptcy case.
Thus, it is not clear whether this would be something that the trustee and bank-
ruptcy court could, or would, prefer to do.
In addition, from a strategic and policy standpoint, it is not likely that an
Indian tribe would want to liquidate its real property.  Aside from its gaming
operations on Indian land, reservations provide tribes a physical space for its
members to live and for the tribe to conduct its governmental functions.  This
would also be counter-intuitive to the Indian Reorganization Act, which
reflected Congress’s desire to return land to Indian tribes and remedy some of
the effects of the allotment process.196  Taking these issues into consideration,
a chapter 7 liquidation of an Indian tribe’s assets, particularly its real property,
would be legally challenging, impractical and against federal policy with
respect to Indian tribes.
2. Chapter 11 – Reorganization
Chapter 11 provides a vehicle for a debtor to restructure its debts with
creditors through reorganization, rather than straight liquidation of its assets.
One of the primary goals of reorganization is for the debtor to become finan-
cially stable and viable after emerging from bankruptcy.  Although businesses
primarily use chapter 11, individuals may file under this chapter as well.  Gen-
erally speaking, in a voluntary bankruptcy case under chapter 11,197 the debtor
Stat. 329 (1793).  The second Act added some additional provisions with respect to negotiat-
ing Indian land. Id. at 330-331 § 8; see also Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida
County, 414 U.S. 661 n. 4 (1974).  Congress continued to pass subsequent Nonintercourse
Acts to address term expiration periods. See 1796 Act, 4th Cong. Ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469 (1796);
1799 Act, 5th Cong. Ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743 (1799); 1802 Act, 7th Cong. Ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139
(1802), until passing the final Act of 1834, 23d Cong. Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834), now
codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177.
195 See Brian Pierson, Resolving a Perilous Uncertainty: The Right of Tribes to Convey Fee
Simple Lands, FED. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2010, at 49, 49-50 (citations omitted); cf. Cass Cnty. v.
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 110-15 (1998) (holding that when
Congress has made land on Indian reservations freely alienable, the land is subject to state
and local taxation, even if the land is re-purchased by an Indian tribe).
196 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2006).
197 A debtor may also be unwillingly forced into bankruptcy by creditors who have filed an
involuntary petition and meet certain statutory requirements; this option is available under
chapters 7, 11 or 15 (as added by BAPCPA). See id. §§ 303, 1511 (2006).  By default under
the Code, involuntary petitions are not permitted under Chapters 9, 12, or 13.
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submits a proposed reorganization plan to the bankruptcy court;198 this plan
proposes the debtor’s treatment of claims and interests in and against the
debtor, typically held by creditors and equity holders.  The debtor’s plan may
propose to impair a claim or interest, that is, modify the claim or interest of
those holding claims against the debtor, which may result in the debtor’s repay-
ment of a debt less than the original amount of debt owed or a change of the
payment due date.199
To be confirmed by the bankruptcy court, the debtor’s proposed treatment
of claims must meet certain statutory requirements under the Code.200  Depend-
ing on the treatment under the plan, creditors decide whether or not to accept
the proposed plan.  If one or more creditors choose to reject the plan, the debtor
may still be able to confirm the plan via nonconsensual cram down against the
creditor.201  However, the debtor must meet certain statutory requirements to
cram down a plan under chapter 11.202
Bankruptcy under chapter 11 is an attractive option for insolvent busi-
nesses; the debtor is usually able to continue operating as a business during the
pendency of the bankruptcy and typically remains in control of the business as
the debtor-in-possession (“DIP”).203  This role is akin to being the trustee in
bankruptcy, and in fact, the DIP enjoys the same rights and duties that the
trustee normally holds.204  Of course, this is a condensed version of chapter 11.
In reality, there are many more variables and considerations involving the typi-
cal chapter 11 business case, such as the court’s determination of whether the
business is worth more as a going concern rather than being liquidated; DIP
financing; issues pertaining to creditors’ committees; cash collateral motions;
motions to dismiss or convert the bankruptcy case; valuation of debtor’s prop-
erty; adversary proceedings filed under the bankruptcy case (and the separate
proceedings that an adversary proceeding entails); the debtor’s disclosure state-
ment and proposed plan for reorganization; creditors’ objections to the plan;
and so on and so forth.  Once the bankruptcy court confirms the plan however,
the plan becomes binding on all the parties involved in the process.205
Given the usual result of bankruptcy under chapters 7 and 11, it is more
likely that an Indian tribe with gaming operations in financial distress would
seek bankruptcy relief under chapter 11.  Gaming has provided tribes with a
means of economic development and self-sufficiency.  Therefore, an Indian
tribe would most likely seek to retain its casino and gaming operations and
attempt to restructure its debt, rather than liquidating its assets as a means of
maintaining this significant source of revenue for the tribe.  As previously dis-
cussed, liquidation under chapter 7 may not be a viable option, given the
restrictions imposed on alienation of Indian land by the federal government.
198 This is the debtor’s exclusive right for the first 120 days of the bankruptcy, pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2006).
199 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(1) (2006).
200 Id. §§ 1123(a)(1), 1129(a).
201 Id. § 1129(b).
202 Id. § 1129(b)(2).
203 Unless upon motion, the bankruptcy court decides that there is cause to appoint a trustee
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
204 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006).
205 Id. § 1141(a) (2005).
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Moreover, because an Indian tribe does not constitute an individual under the
Code, the tribe would likely file as a business under chapter 11.  Doing so
would allow the tribe to remain in control of its business, and by extension, its
gaming operations as the DIP.  By filing under chapter 11 and successfully
confirming a plan, a tribe in financial distress could restructure its debts and
thus benefit from the equitable provisions provided by the Code to most other
individuals and entities.
Notwithstanding the potential benefits available to an Indian tribe seeking
to restructure its debts under Chapter 11, a tribe’s filing under this chapter is
also not without caveats.  For example, under a typical Chapter 11 business
case, the proposed plan of the business may call for a “debt-for-equity” swap.
Under this scheme, the creditor—usually a secured creditor or debenture
holder—“swaps” their claim of debt against the debtor for a commensurate
stake of equity in the reorganized debtor.206  This proves to be beneficial for
both the debtor and creditor.  The debtor is able to emerge from bankruptcy
substantially free from the burden of the creditor’s claim and obtains a
“delevered” balance sheet, thus making it more feasible for the debtor to obtain
financing, become financially stable, and perhaps even profitable.207  The cred-
itor receives its payment through the acquisition of the debtor, and for a credi-
tor looking to obtain a distressed business, acquires the business through a less
risky fashion than by sale either under the Code or Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.208
Unfortunately, this scheme is problematic, and likely inapplicable, to
Indian tribes filing under Chapter 11.  An important provision of the IGRA
provides that Indian tribes conducting Class II gaming operations on its reser-
vation retain sole proprietary interest in those gaming operations.209  In order to
do so, the NIGC reviews and approves contracts that a tribe seeks to enter into
with a tribal non-member with respect to the tribe’s gaming operations.210  If
the NIGC determines that a potential contract is in fact a “management con-
tract,” that is, a contract that amounts to the outside management of tribal gam-
ing operations, the NIGC may deny the contract and render it invalid.211  This
action renders the contract invalid as a matter of law.  The NIGC has defined a
management contract as a “contract or agreement [that] provides for the man-
agement of all or part of the gaming operation.”212
The important point under the IGRA is that the tribe must retain the sole
propriety interests in its gaming operations.  Thus, a tribe’s proposal for a debt-
for-equity swap would be invalid under the IGRA as it would give a creditor
rights, and thus control, in the tribe’s gaming operations.  Moreover, if an
206 Leonard P. Goldberger, Debt-For-Equity Moves Down the Food Chain, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Oct. 2010, at 30, 30.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(A) (2006).
210 See generally id. § 2711 (1988).
211 See id. § 2711(e)(1)(A).
212 NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, BULL. NO. 94-5, APPROVED MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS
V. CONSULTING AGREEMENTS (UNAPPROVED MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS ARE VOID), (1994),
http://www.nigc.gov/Reading_Room/Bulletins/Bulletin_No._1994-5.aspx (citing 25 C.F.R.
§ 502.15).
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Indian tribe’s reorganization plan called for a debt-for-equity swap, the creditor
would gain an equity interest in the reorganized debtor—the Indian tribe.  This
would result in a creditor becoming an equity holder in an Indian tribe, which
among other things, expressly contravenes and violates the sovereign status of
Indian tribes in the United States.  Therefore, this reorganization tool would not
be available to Indian tribes filing under Chapter 11.
CONCLUSION
Since Congress’ enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988,
Indian tribes have developed and expanded significant gaming operations,
including major casino facilities, on federally recognized Indian lands across
the United States.  These gaming operations have in turn provided Indian tribes
a considerable source of revenue and a meaningful avenue for Indian self-deter-
mination and economic viability.
As a result of the Great Recession, businesses across a variety of indus-
tries have been hit hard by high unemployment rates and a considerable
decrease in consumer spending.  This includes the once-thought “recession
proof” casino gaming industry.  The Great Recession has hit the casino gaming
industry particularly hard as Americans tighten their belts, so to speak, and
have been less likely to patronize and freely spend disposable income at casi-
nos.  Casinos, whether on Indian land or not, have experienced this substantial
decrease in spending.  Some casinos, barely able to meet financial obligations
incurred before the recession set in, struggle with significant debt and teeter on
the edge of insolvency while gaming revenue continues to decline.
Though financially distressed non-Indian casinos have bankruptcy availa-
ble as a means of addressing insolvency, bankruptcy is not an option available
to casinos owned and operated by Indian tribes.  This is largely because of the
sovereign status of Indian tribes and the unique “domestic dependent nations”
policy of the federal government toward Indian tribes.  Before the current
recession, tribal eligibility under federal bankruptcy law was not a pressing
issue because Indian gaming, a fairly recent phenomenon, was highly lucrative
for tribes and historically not subject to recessionary declines in consumerism.
The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly provide a form of relief for
Indian tribes as debtors.  If a tribe seeks to file for bankruptcy, it will either
need to find a way to argue that the tribe meets the definition of a debtor, or
Congress will need to address this issue by amending the Code to provide for
Indian tribes.  However, there are major challenges with both these avenues.
Even if a tribe successfully filed for bankruptcy, it is not clear that it would be
able to take full advantage of all the provisions under the Code available to
other types of debtors, which in turn may hinder a tribe’s ability to successfully
emerge from bankruptcy.  Moreover, given the complexity of the special rela-
tionship between Indian tribes and the federal government, it is not clear that
Congress would be able to easily amend the Code to provide tribes a source of
relief under federal bankruptcy laws.  In short, whether an Indian tribe may file
for bankruptcy relief under federal bankruptcy law is unclear – there is no eas-
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ily ascertainable or straightforward answer and the issue may take some time to
fully address.  Until then, Indian tribes will likely need to find creative ways to
address insolvency outside the Bankruptcy Code.
